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Operative Gift and Bequest Motives
Abstract

The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, which is the proposition that changes in the timing of lump-sum taxes
have no effect on assumption or capital accumulation, depends on the exist- of operative altruistic motives for
intergenerational transfers. These transfers can be bequests from parents to children or gifts from children to
parents. In order for the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem to hold, one of these transfer motives must be
operative in the sense that the level of the transfer is not determined by a corner solution resulting from a
binding non-negativity constraint This paper derives conditions that determine whether the bequest motive
will be operative, the gift motive will be operative, or neither motive will be operative in a model in which
consumers are altruistic toward their parents and their children.
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Operative Gift and Bequest Motives
By ANDREW B. ABEL*
In a pioneering paper, Robert Barro (1974)
demonstrated that if consumers have operative altruistic bequest motives, then a reduction in lump-sum taxes, accompanied by the
issue of an equal amount of government
bonds, has no effect on the allocation of
resources. Barro stressed that this result,
which has come to be known as the Ricardian
Equivalence Theorem, requires that the bequest motive be operative. In this context,
the term "operative" means that equilibrium
bequests are determined by tangency conditions rather than by corner solutions such
as may arise from binding nonnegativity
constraints. If the bequest motive is not operative, then the Ricardian equivalence result
presented by Barro does not hold, and
there are important effects associated with
the government's choice between debt finance and taxes.

tive. Several papers have studied whether the
bequest motive is operative in a variety of
different models' but the literature does not
contain an analysis of the conditions that
determine whether the gift motive is operative. In this paper, I will study the conditions
for an operative gift motive. However, rather
than confine the analysis to a model in which
consumers have only a gift motive, I will
assume that individual consumers have twosided transfer motives. That is, I will assume
that individual consumers have both a gift
motive and a bequest motive as in John
Burbidge (1983), Buiter and Carmichael
(1984), and Burbidge (1984).2 In the steadystate equilibrium, the gift motive may be
operative, the bequest motive may be operative, or neither motive may be operative. If
either of the intergenerational transfer motives is operative, then the Ricardian
Equivalence Theorem holds; however, if
neither motive is operative, then changes in
the timing of lump-sum taxes have important effects on the intertemporal and intergenerational allocation of resources.3
The major goal of this paper is to determine conditions under which each of the
intergenerational transfer motives is operative if individual consumers have two-sided
transfer motives. As a prerequisite to this
analysis, I will discuss, in Section I, appropriate restrictions on the gift motive and
the bequest motive. In Section II, I will
discuss the restrictions on two-sided transfer
motives implied by intergenerational consis-

More recently, Willem Buiter (1979) and
Jeffrey Carmichael (1982) have analyzed the
altruistic gift motive in which consumers
obtain utility from the utility of their parents,
and thus may be motivated to give resources
to their parents. Their analyses confirm
Barro's claim (p. 1104) that if the gift motive
is operative, then the Ricardian Equivalence
Theorem holds. If the gift motive is not
operative, then the Ricardian Equivalence
Theorem fails to hold.
Because the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem depends on an operative motive for
private intergenerational transfers, it is important to determine the conditions under
which either transfer motive will be opera-

'See Allan Drazen (1978), Weil (1987), Alex Cukier-

sity. I thank B. Douglas Bernheim, Olivier Blanchard,

man (1986), Cukierman and Allan Meltzer (1986),
Martin Feldstein (1976), and Abel (1986).
2Recently, Miles Kimball (1986) has extended the
analysis in this paper to analyze the conditions under
which there will be an operative bequest motive under
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The parameter /3 measures the strength of
the bequest motive and satisfies the restriction 0 ?,B <1. The assumption that /3
must be less than one is the standard assumption in the literature6 and is necessary
and sufficient for the transversality condition
to hold in the steady state with constant per
capita consumption. The nonnegative parameter a measures the strength of the gift
motive. There is no compelling reason to
restrict a to be less than one.7'8 I will show
in Section II that intergenerational consistency (defined below) places an upper bound
on the admissible values of a, but depending
on the value of /3, this upper bound may be
greater than, equal to, or less than one.

tency. The specification of the motives for
intergenerational transfers has important
implications for a wide range of issues
extending beyond the effects of fiscal policy,
including the intergenerational transmission
of inequality,4 and for the behavior of
financial markets, especially markets for life
insurance and annuities.5 In Section III I
discuss the endogenous determination of
equilibrium factor prices and then describe
the steady-state equilibrium. The conditions
under which one or the other of the transfer
motives is operative are derived in Section IV. I present concluding remarks in
Section V.
I. A Two-Sided Transfer Motive

In this section I present a two-sided
transfer motive and discuss appropriate
restrictions on the parameters of the transfer
motive. Consider a representative consumer
economy in which each consumer lives for
two periods. A generation t consumer is
born at the beginning of period t. consumes

6See, for example, Buiter (1979), Buiter and Carmichael (1984), Carmichael (1982), Burbidge (1983,
1984), and Philippe Weil (1987).
7Buiter-Carmichael (1984) note that the specification

of the gift motive as v, = u, + av,_1 implies that v, (-,' u t _j. They argue that if a > 1, then the utility v,
is unbounded as t approaches infinity. However, even if
a > 1, the maximization of (3) subject to the constraints
c2t+1
on the generation t consumer is a well-defined maximi-

clt in period t at age 1 and consumes
zation
in period t + 1 at age 2. Let ut = U(clto c2t+1)

be the utility that a generation t consumer
obtains directly from his own consumption.

problem.

Alternatively, Buiter-Carmichael point out that if v,
is constant over time, then the "steady-state utility
function" is u(C1,C2) U(C1,C2)/[1-al where c, is
Defining ult as d u(cjt,c2t+1)/dcjt and u2t+1
the steady-state consumption of consumers of age i.
as du(clt, c2t,?)/3c2t+1, assume that u,t > O,
They observe that if a>1, then "the model has the
peculiar characteristic that the steady-state utility
u2t+l> >O and that ult(O. ) = x= u2t+(, 0).
function v(*) has the opposite properties to the
Also, assume that u(-,.) is strictly concave
consumption utility u(-); for example, if u(-) is posi-

and that c1t and c2t+1 are normal goods.

In addition to obtaining utility directly
from his own consumption, a generation t
consumer obtains utility from the consumption of his parents and from the consumption
of all of his descendants. In particular, I will
use the Buiter-Carmichael (1984) generalization of the Burbidge (1983) two-sided
utility function
00

(1) vt ut + aut- 1 + E, Ajut+=
j=-1

tive and increasing in cl and c2, v( ) is negative and
decreasing in cl and c2." (p. 763) However, the
"steady-state utility function" v(-) is not a useful
construct. Paul Samuelson (1968) showed that the

steady-state capital stock is lower than the Golden Rule
capital stock if consumption is allocated to maximize

the weighted sum of utility of all generations, with
declining weights on future generations (which is

formally identical to the problem faced by consumers

with a bequest motive in (2)). Maximization of the

"steady-state utility function" led Buiter (1979) to
conclude erroneously that if either the bequest motive
or the gift motive is operative, then a competitive

economy would attain the Golden Rule in the steady
state and that "lump-sum taxation and debt policy will

not affect the steady-state capital-labor ratio if there are
both bequest and gift motives." (p. 425).

(1984); and Nigel Tomes (1981).

81n an interesting analysis of consumption and gift
behavior under a specific assumption about expectations
of future gifts, Hajime Hori and Jun Tsukamoto (1985)

5See, for example, Stanley Fischer (1973) and
Benjamin Friedman and Mark Warshawsky (1984).

which a < 1.

4See Andrew Abel (1985), Laurence Kotlikoff et al.

analyze the case in which a> 1 as well as the case in

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:46:17 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

VOL. 77 NO. 5 ABEL: GIFT AND BEQUEST MOTI VES 1039

The two-sided utility function in (1) nests
both the one-sided altruistic bequest motive
and the one-sided altruistic gift motive. The
one-sided altruistic bequest motive is often
specified recursively as

(2) v,t= ut + vt+ 1,
When a(= 0, the utility function in (1) is
consistent with the recursively specified
altruistic bequest motive in (2).9
The one-sided gift motive is often speci-

Let g, be the gift given by a generation t
consumer to his parent who is a generation
t -1 consumer. This gift is made during
period t which is the only period during
which both generations are alive. Because
the generation t consumer has one parent
and n children, this consumer gives a gift of

gt in period t and receives gifts totaling
ngt + 1in period t + 1.
Let bt be the bequest given by a generation

fied recursively as vt = ut + av,1, which can

t consumer to each of his n children
(generation t + 1 consumers) in period t + 1.
The generation t consumer receives a bequest

be rewritten as

bt -1 from his parent in period t. In addition

(3) v= ut + aut,_ + a2vt2.

generation t consumer inelastically supplies
one unit of labor in period t and receives the

From the point of view of the generation t
consumer with the one-sided gift motive in

(3), the utility of his grandparent, Vt-2, is
fixed; maximization of the utility function in
(3) is equivalent to maximization of the utility
function in (1) when /3 = 0. Thus, the utility
function in (1) nests the one-sided altruistic
bequest motive and the one-sided altruistic

gift motive.'0
Before presenting the consumer's budget constraint, it is necessary to describe
the demographic composition of dynastic
families. Each consumer lives for two periods
and has n ?1 children at the beginning of
the second period of his life. This assumption follows the standard convention of
ignoring the fact that it takes two people

to receiving the bequest bt1 in period t, the

real wage rate wt in period t. The generation

t consumer is retired in period t + 1. Letting

R +1 be the gross rate of return on saving

held from period t to period t + 1, the budget
constraint of a representative period t
consumer is

(4) [clt + gt]Rt,+l +C2t+1+ nbt
= [wt + b,]Rt+l + ngt+,.
The left-hand side of (4) contains the
generation t consumer's expenditure on his
own consumption in the two periods of his
life plus the expenditure on bequests to
children and a gift to his parent. The righthand side of (4) contains the three sources of

from different families to produce children."1
the generation t consumer's resources: labor
In the model, each consumer has n children
and has one parent.'2

income, bequest received from his parent,
and the gifts received from his children.
I use the standard Nash assumption that
in choosing optimal values of consumption,

9Douglas Gale (1983) has pointed out that there is
an infinity of infinite-horizon utility functions which are
consistent with the recursive formulation in (2). By
starting with equation (1) as the specification of
preferences, I am explicitly choosing one solution, a
practice which is followed, at least implicitly, in an
overwhelming majority of the literature.
?The relation between the utility function in (1) and
"two-sided altruism" is discussed in Miles Kimball
(1986).

I'Douglas Bernheim and Kyle Bagwell (1984)

recently provided a stimulating analysis of the impli-

cations of marriage and altruism for the efficacy of fiscal
policy.

12This point has not been appreciated in the gift
motive literature. In fairness to Carmichael, it must be

noted that he seemed to be aware of this point and
avoided its implications by treating the "descendents
and forebearers as though there were only one of each;
the descendent will be n times 'bigger,' and the forebearer n times 'smaller' than the individual." (1979, fn.
2). Subsequently, Buiter and Carmichael (1984, p. 763,
fn. 2) recognized that each consumer has one, rather
have

than l/n, (set of) parent(s). They use this observation
to make an insightful comment on Burbidge's specification of the utility function, but they ignore this
observation in deriving optimal individual behavior
under the Nash assumption.
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bequests, and gifts, the consumer takes as
given the actions of all other members of his
dynastic family. In particular, in choosing

at an interior optimum (g, > 0), then the

utility loss (ul,) from the reduction in cl,
will equal the utility gain (au2,) from the

gt, the generation t consumer takes as given
increased gift. If, at g, = O, the utility loss

from reduced consumption exceeds the utility
gain from an increased gift, then the
consumer will not make a positive gift, and
the nonnegativity constraint on the gift binds
tivity constraints'3 gt ? 0 and bt > 0strictly.
and It is worth noting that if, for some
subject to the given values of the decisions of
unspecified reason, siblings jointly decide on
all other members of the dynastic family.
the level of the gift to give to their common
Recalling that ult and u2t?1 are the deriv-parent, or equivalently, if each consumer is
assumed to have 1/n parents, then the firstatives of u(clt, c2t+ 1) with respect to its first
order condition (6) must be amended to
and second arguments, respectively, the
first-order conditions are

the gifts given by his siblings to their common parent. The maximization problem of a
representative generation t consumer is to
maximize (1) subject to (4), the nonnega-

(5) u=t = Rt+ u2t+

(6') ult ? anu2t
(holds with equality if gt

(6) ult 2 au2t

Equation (6') corresponds to the first-order
derived by Carmichael (1982) and
(holds with equality ifcondition
gt > 0)
is consistent with the conditions in Buiter

(7) u2t+ 1 2 ( /n )u1t+ 1

and Carmichael (1984).
Equation (7) characterizes the optimal

(holds with equality if bt > 0)
bequest bt. The generation t consumer can
Equation (5) characterizes the optimal intertemporal allocation of the consumer's own
consumption over his lifetime. If the con-

reduce c2t+ 1 by one unit and increase

the bequest to each child by 1/n, which
increases the utility of each child by

(1/n)ult+1. If the bequest motive is oper
sumer reduces clt by one unit, he sufferstive
a (be > 0), then the utility loss from

decreased consumption is equal to the utility
utility loss of ult. However, if this unit of the

gain from increasing the bequest. If the nonconsumption good is saved, then c2t+1 can
negativity constraint binds strictly, then the
be increased by R t + units, which increases
inequality in (7) holds strictly.
utility by Rt+lu2t+l. At the optimum, the
utility loss in period t is equated to the
utility gain in period t + 1, as indicated
by (5).
Equation (6) characterizes the optimal gift

II. Intergenerational Consistency Under a
Two-Sided Motive

In this section I discuss the conditions
under which the decisions of different genwithin a family are " intergeneraunit, suffering a utility loss of ult, and erations
can
tionally consistent." There are two aspects of
increase the gift gt by one unit, increasing
consistency. First, there is
his parent's utility by u2,. The increaseintergenerational
in
the notion of dynamic consistency introparent's utility raises the generation t consumer's utility by au2t. If the optimal gift is duced by Robert Strotz (1956). Strotz showed
that for a particular formulation of the intertemporal utility function in which the discount factor between two periods depends
13 The assumption that the marginal utility of
only on the length of time between the two
consumption at each age becomes infinite as the level of
periods, and not on calendar time, the conconsumption approaches zero implies that any nonsumption plan will be dynamically inconnegativity constraints on consumption will not be
sistent unless the discount factors are geobinding.

gt. In period t, the generation t consumer

can reduce his own consumption by one
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metrically declining. In the context of the

is a gross production function in the sense

utility function in (1), it is important that the

that the aggregate capital stock, Kt+l, is
weights on u,+j are geometrically declining
equal to output, Yt, minus total consumption,
for j = 0,1, 2,.... If these weights were not
Ntc1t + Nt-1C2t, in period t. The production

geometrically declining, then the consump-

function can be written in intensive form as

tion plan would suffer from dynamic incon-

y= f(k), where y is the output-labor ratio,

sistency in Strotz's sense, if the bequest motive were operative.
The second notion of intergenerational

k is the capital-labor ratio, f ' > 0 and f " < 0.
In competitive factor markets, each factor
is paid its marginal product

consistency is that the first-order conditions

of parents and their children should not
contradict each other. More precisely, con-

sider the first-order condition characterizing
the optimal gift from a child to a parent at
time t (equation (6)) and the first-order
condition characterizing the optimal bequest
from a parent to a child at time t (equation
(7) with the time subscript decremented by
1). If both of these first-order conditions are
to hold, then

(10) Rt = R(kt)=f (kt)
(I11) Wt = w(kt)-f (kt) -ktf (kt).
The steady state is characterized by constant
values of consumption for both young

consumers and old consumers. Therefore, ul

and u2t are each constant in the steady state.
Equations (5)-(7) imply that in the steady
state the interest rate R must satisfy the
following condition

(8) Ult > ?U2, ? (I3a/n)ult.
Because u1, is assumed to be positive,
equation (8) implies that

(9) /a3<an.
Equation (9) along with the restrictions 0 <
/3 <1 and a ? 0 describe the admissible
values of the parameters a and /3 under the
restriction that the two-sided transfer motive
is intergenerationally consistent.

(12) a < R < n/3.
If one of the transfer motives is operative,
then the steady-state interest rate is at one of
the boundaries in (12). In particular,

(13a) R=n/13 if b>O,
(13b) R= a if g>O.

Since /3 is restricted to be less than one,

equation (13a) yields the well-known result
III. Competitive Factor Prices and
that a steady state with operative bequests is
Steady-State Equilibrium
undercapitalized relative to the Golden Rule
(i.e., R > n). However, since a can be less
In the previous sections I analyzed the
than, greater than, or equal to n, equation
behavior of an individual dynastic family
(13b) implies that a steady state with an
operative
gift motive can be either overcapitaking as given the factor prices wt and Rt.
These factor prices, which are determined
talized, undercapitalized, or at the Golden
endogenously in competitive factor markets,
Rule. This result is contrary to the result in
depend on the productive technology. Let YtCarmichael (1982) that a steady state with
be gross output in period t. This output is
an operative gift motive is overcapitalized.
homogenous and can either be consumed
Carmichael's overcapitalization result folor used as capital in the following period.
lows from his assumption that the gift
The level of output is determined by a neoparameter a must be less than one and from
classical linearly homogeneous production
his implicit assumption that siblings jointly
determine
the gifts to their common parent
function Yt = F(Kt, Nt), where Kt is the
agaccording to (6'). Under this pair of asgregate stock of capital and Nt is the number
of young consumers who each supply one
sumptions, R = na < n in the steady state
with operative gifts.
unit of labor. The production function F(,)
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Finally, observe from (13a, b) that if af3 <
n, then either bequests or gifts must be equal

to zero in the steady state. In the case with
a,8 = n, which is on the boundary of the

Kt+IN tst, which can be written as
(14) nkt+l =: St -

admissible region of the parameter space,
and which corresponds to Burbidge's spec-

Rather than determine the saving of a
generation t consumer as the solution to an
ification,"4 it is possible for both gifts and
infinite-horizon maximization problem, I will
bequests to be positive in the steady state.
follow Weil's approach and ask the folHowever, as shown below in Section IV, the
lowing question: How much would a gendirection of net intergenerational transfers
eration t consumer save if he earns a wage
will be determinate in this case. Also note
income wt, receives a bequest bt-1 from his
that with a3 = n, the range of possible valparent, receives gifts totaling ngt+1 from his
ues for the steady-state interest rate in (12) is
n children, earns a rate of return Rt+ , and,
degenerate: the steady-state interest rate is
in addition, if he is arbitrarily required to

equal to n /,8 = a regardless of the level of
government debt that is serviced by lumpsum taxes. Finally, since at least one of the
transfer motives is operative, the Ricardian
Equivalence Theorem holds in this case, as
argued by Burbidge.
IV. When Are the Transfer Motives Operative?

The neutrality of government debt requires
that one of the transfer motives be operative
both before and after the change in government debt, and furthermore, that the same
motive be operative after the change as
before the change. Since the Ricardian
Equivalence Theorem rests on the existence
of an operative transfer motive, the question
of when one of the transfer motives will be
operative takes on great importance. In this
section, I extend Weil's (1987) analysis of
the one-sided bequest motive in (2) to the
case of the two-sided utility function in (1).

leave a bequest of bt to each of his children
and to give a gift of gt to his parent?

Although I cannot answer this question
explicitly at this level of generality, the saving
function will have the following form

(15) St s(bt1- gt + wt,
n(gt.l - bt), Rt+?).
The saving function in (15) depends on
first-period income, second-period income,
and the rate of return to saving. Under the

assumption that clt and c21+1 are both

normal goods, s(.,.,.) is increasing in its first
argument and is decreasing in its second
argument. Substituting the competitive factor
prices (10,11) into (15), then substituting the
resulting expression into (14) and restricting
attention to the steady state yields

(16) h(k, b-g) s(b-g + w(k),

Recall that Kt+1 is the total stock of

n (g-b), R (k))-nk = 0.

capital at the beginning of period t + 1. All
of this capital is held by generation t
consumers and, furthermore, this is the only
asset held by these consumers. Therefore,

I follow Peter Diamond (1965) and confine
attention to locally stable steady states (i.e.,
steady states for which hk< 0). To avoid
letting st denote the saving of a representative generation t consumer, it follows that
any complications that may arise from multiple locally stable steady states, I follow
Weil and assume that there is a unique locally
"4Actually, Burbidge departed from the Nash as- stable steady state. Let k = k*(z) be the
steady-state capital labor ratio when b - g
sumption in determining an individual consumer's
optimal gift and thus arrived at the analogue of (6')
rather than (6). Under this assumption, the boundary of
the admissible region of parameter values is a/3 =1

rather than a/3 = n. Adjusting Burbidge's analysis to
incorporate the Nash assumption would amend his as-

sumption to afi = n.

-z.

As a point of reference, consider the steady
state of the Diamond (1965) economy in
which consumers have neither a bequest
motive nor a gift motive. Let k D denote
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the steady-state capital-labor ratio in the
Diamond economy. Because b = g = 0 in the
Diamond economy, it follows that

(17) k D = k*(O).

PROPOSITION 3: If ?8 < n/RD, a< RD,
and a3 < n, then b=g=O.
PROOF:

(by contradiction): Suppose that b > 0 so
that (13a) implies that R = n/,l ? RD.
Recall that the saving function s(-,,.) is
Therefore, (18) implies that b - g < 0 which
increasing in its first argument and is deimplies that g> 0. However, if g> 0, then
creasing in its second argument. Therefore, it (1 3b) implies that R = a, which contradicts
follows from the definition of h(k, z) in (16)
the statements above that R = n 7/3 and a/3

that h,(k, z) > 0 and hence k*(z) is an in-

creasing function of z.15 Because k*'(z) > 0
and R'(k) < 0, equation (17) implies that

(18) b-g>O as k>kD as R<RD.
I now present simple conditions which are
sufficient for each type of transfer motive to
be operative. Essentially, in order for a
transfer motive to be operative, it must be
sufficiently strong. Proposition 1, which
provides a sufficient condition for operative
bequests, is due to Weil (1987); Proposition
2, which provides a sufficient condition for
operative gifts, is new.

< n. Therefore, b = 0. A similar line of
argument proves that g = 0.
Finally, we consider the case in which
af8 = n, which corresponds to the case

considered by Burbidge."6 In general, it is
possible for there to be both positive gifts
and positive bequests in the steady state.
Nevertheless, one can determine whether the
net flow of intergenerational transfers is from

parents to children (b -g > 0), from children
to parents (b - g < 0), or zero.

PROPOSITION 4: If a/I? = n, then b - g > 0

as RD nl// = a.
PROOF:

PROPOSITION 1: If: > n/RD, then b > 0.
PROOF:

If 8 > n/RD, then (12) implies that RD >
n /1 ? R. Therefore, (18) implies that b - g
> 0, which along with the nonnegativity
constraint on g, implies that b > 0.

Suppose that RD> n /3. It follows from
(12) that RD> R which, according to (18),

implies that b-g > O. Similarly, RD <a

implies that RD < R, which according to
(18) implies that b - g < 0. Finally, RD =
n//B = a implies that RD = R, which implies
that b - g = 0.

PROPOSITION 2: If a > R D, then g > 0.

The results concerning when the transfer
motives will be operative are summarized in
PROOF:
Figures 1 and 2. The distinction between
If a> RD, then (12) implies that RD < a
Figures 1 and 2 is that the utility function
< R. Therefore, (18) implies that b - g < 0,
u(-, ) and the production function f( ) are
which along with the nonnegativity consuch that the steady state of the Diamond
straint on b, implies that g > 0.
economy is efficient in Figure 1 but is
inefficient in Figure 2. If the Diamond
If both transfer motives are sufficiently weak, economy is efficient, then Figure 1 indicates
then there will be no transfers in either
that either the gift motive or the bequest
direction. Precise conditions are given by
motive could be operative; if neither motive
is sufficiently strong, then neither motive will
be operative. If the Diamond economy is

15Formally, h(k*(z), z)-- 0, which implies that
16See fn. 14.
k*'(z) = - hz/hk > 0.
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provides a useful summary of the utility

ln3f '

function u(*, ) and the production function
f( ) for determining whether a transfer motive will be operative. Nevertheless, it would
be useful to state the conditions for oper-

ative bequests in terms of underlying preferences and technology. As a step toward this
goal, I will relate RD to consumer behavior
expressed in terms of the average propensity
to consume and to the production function
expressed in terms of the capital share of
income. Then, for a specific example I will
express RD directly in terms of the parameters of preferences and technology.

Bequests
No Transfers Gifts

0

_

-

,D

n RD

ocK

FIGURE 1

Let a, denote s,/wt, the average propensity
to save out of wage income, and let 4, denote
the capital share in income, R,k,/y,. Because

the production function is assumed to be
linearly homogeneous, the labor share in

income, w,/y,, is equal to 1- 4t so that
iC-n

(19) w, = [(1- ojlot] Rtk.
It follows from (19) and the definition of the

average propensity to save, at, that

(20) St = a [(1- j)/ot] Rkt
Equating the left-hand side of (14) to the
right-hand side of (20) in the steady state of
the Diamond economy yields

No

(21) nkD = a [(1 - ()p/] R DkD.

Transfers Gi fts

O

'D
R n

n

o

FIGURE 2

inefficient, then Figure 2 indicates that, for
admissible values of ,B, the bequest motive
cannot be operative, which is consistent with
Weil's (1987) results. However, the gift
motive can be operative if it is sufficiently
strong. Again, if neither motive is sufficiently
strong, then neither will be operative.
The conditions for operative transfer motives are stated in terms of RD, the steadystate interest rate in the Diamond model. It
was Weil's insight to recognize that the RD

It follows immediately from (21) that
(22) RD = n4/[a(I -)]
It follows from (22) that in the Diamond
economy, the steady-state interest rate tends
to be large when either the capital share in
income, 4, is large or the average propensity
to save, a, is small. Of course, the capital
share, 4, and the average propensity to save,
a, are, in general, endogenously determined.
However, there is a special case in which

both 4 and a are exogenous parameters. If

the utility function is logarithmic, u(clt,
C2t +l 1)(I- a)ln clt + a 1n C2t+ 1, 0 < a < 1,

then the average propensity to save out of
wage income is constant and equal to a. If
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the production function is Cobb-Douglas,

not hold; the extent of the departure from

f(k)-AkV, O< 4 <1 and A > O, then the

the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, that is,
the magnitude of the effect of fiscal policy,
would depend on the proportion of consumers who face binding constraints. In a
subsequent paper (Abel, 1986), I have begun
to explore some of these issues. However, the
model in that paper is restricted to CobbDouglas technology, logarithmic utility with
a bequest motive but no gift motive, and the
heterogeneity is restricted to initial wealth.
In addition to analyzing more general utility
and production functions, future research
should analyze the effects of fiscal policy in
the presence of heterogeneous labor productivity, secular productivity growth, and twosided transfer motives.
An additional avenue for future research
is to analyze bequest and gift behavior under
more general forms of intergenerational
transfer motives. Bernheim (1987) has argued
that there is no reason to insist on dynamic
consistency in modeling the consumption
and transfer behavior of families. Recently,
Debraj Ray (1987) has examined specifications of intergenerational altruism in
which a consumer obtains utility from the

capital share in income is constant and equal
to p. In this special case, the expression for
RD on the right-hand side of (22) is simply a
function of the parameters of preferences
and technology. Substituting this expression
for RD in Propositions 1-4 delivers, for this
example, a complete characterization, in
terms of the parameters of preferences and
technology, of situations in which the transfer motives will be operative or inoperative.
V. Concluding Remarks

The effects of changes in the timing of
lump-sum taxes depend crucially on whether
the motives for intergenerational transfers
are operative. In this paper I have derived
conditions which determine whether the
bequest motive is operative, the gift motive
is operative, or neither motive is operative.
When neither motive is operative, then
changes in the timing of lump-sum taxes

affect the intertemporal and intergenerational allocation of resources.
The formal results presented in Propositions 1-4 and summarized in Figures 1
and 2 apply only to the steady state of a
representative consumer economy. Future
research should be devoted to extending the
analysis to the transition path outside the
steady state and should analyze economies
with interesting heterogeneity. The reason
for extending the analysis to the transition
path is that the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem requires that all consumers in all generations be linked by operative-intergenerational transfer motives. If some generation has
no operative-intergenerational transfer motive, then at least some changes in the timing
of lump-sum taxes will affect the intertemporal allocation of resources. The magnitude
of the effect would depend on, among other
things, the extent and sort of heterogeneity
among consumers. For example, heterogene-

utility of many subsequent generations in his
family, in addition to obtaining utility directly from his own consumption. If, for
example, a consumer cares about his
grandchildren's utility in addition to his
children's utility and his own consumption,
then, in general, the consumption decisions
of different generations within the family
will display dynamic inconsistency. In addition, Ray has shown that under this sort of
altruistic utility function, it is possible for
the steady state to be characterized by positive bequests and a dynamically inefficient
overaccumulation of capital. The determination of conditions for the bequest motive to
be operative or inoperative remains an open
question in this more general framework.

ity with respect to initial wealth or labor
income may lead to a situation in which
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